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THE EX ANTE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE CORE
IN THE ABSENCE OF WEALTH EFFECTS
By Françoise Forges, Jean-François Mertens, and Rajiv Vohra1
In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers
facilitate the fulﬁllment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core
is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which
this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.
Keywords: Core, exchange economy, asymmetric information, incentive compatibil-
ity, ex ante, transferable utility, absence of wealth effects, quasi-linear.
1  introduction
Consider an exchange economy in which consumers have private infor-
mation (represented by their types). Issues of resource allocation in such an
economy concern how the allocation is determined by the information state (pro-
ﬁle of agents’ types). An allocation rule, in which the (possibly random) alloca-
tion depends on the information state of the economy, can then be viewed as a
direct mechanism, representing some unspeciﬁed indirect mechanism (that might
include auctions, boycotts, etc.). As is well explained in Holmström and Myerson
(1983), there is no unique and obvious way of extending the notion of Pareto
efﬁciency to mechanisms of such an economy. Naturally, this observation also
applies to the notion of the core—which is the primary interest of the present
paper. An appropriate core notion depends on whether decisions are made at
the ex ante stage or the interim stage.
Deﬁning a core concept at the interim stage involves conceptual difﬁculties
because even the player set is not clear (one player per type?), let alone the
concept of characteristic function. Wilson himself, in his seminal paper (Wilson
(1978)), proposes two different possibilities, the coarse core and the ﬁne core.
And several other core notions too have been analyzed for differential infor-
mation economies at the interim stage.2 But at the ex ante stage, there is no
ambiguity whatsoever about the correct characteristic function, as we will argue
in Section 2. Thus a full cooperative analysis for such exchange economies can
1 We wish to thank Enrico Minelli for numerous, extremely useful discussions on the topic of
this research. Also conversations with Claude d’Aspremont, Andy Postlewaite, Roy Radner, Debraj
Ray, and Roberto Serrano and anonymous referees’ comments have been very helpful. Financial
support from European TMR Network FMRX CT 960055 (Forges and Mertens) and NSF Grant
SES-0133113 (Vohra) is gratefully acknowledged.
2 For example, Ichiishi and Idzik (1996), Lee and Volij (2000), Vohra (1999), Volij (2000), Yannelis
(1991). See Forges, Minelli, and Vohra (2001) for additional references.
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be performed by applying any standard solution concept, like the core, to their
characteristic function.
Our main concern in this paper is this ex ante incentive compatible core:
coalitions can agree, ex ante, upon any incentive compatible mechanism, where a
mechanism goes from a set of proﬁles of players’ actions (sending orders, giving
collateral, etc.) to the set of outcomes, i.e., the feasible set. V S describes then
the set of expected utility vectors that S can get for its members by any such
mechanism. Coalition S has an objection to some mechanism if it can ﬁnd an
incentive compatible mechanism (for S) that increases3 the expected utility of
each agent in S. The ex ante incentive compatible core is the set of all incentive
compatible mechanisms to which there exists no objection. It is the core analog
of Holmström and Myerson’s (1983) notion of ex ante incentive efﬁciency. A
similar concept was used in Allen (1992, 1994) and Vohra (1999).4
It is worth emphasizing that (with concave utilities), when incentive constraints
are not imposed, the ex ante characteristic function is, for the grand coalition,
the same as for the Arrow-Debreu economy with a complete set of contingent
commodities, and for sub-coalitions, included in the latter. So this characteris-
tic function has a nonempty core, and since the same holds for the economy
restricted to any subset of players, it is totally balanced. In particular, with quasi-
linear utilities, it is the characteristic function of some pure-exchange economy,
by the well-known result of Shapley and Shubik (1969). Not surprisingly, incen-
tive constraints make a signiﬁcant difference to the analysis, and the question of
nonemptiness becomes much more elusive. Vohra (1999) identiﬁes some cases
where the ex ante core5 is nonempty: two-consumer economies, economies with
linear utility, and economies with a nonexclusive information structure. McLean
and Postlewaite (1999, 2000) introduce the notion of an economy with informa-
tionally small agents and prove that in such an economy, the ex ante core is
nonempty.
We show here that nonemptiness does depend on such additional assumptions.
Already, restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms, Vohra (1999) provides
an example of a well-behaved economy in which the ex ante core is empty. Our
aim in the present paper is to investigate the extent to which this problem can
be solved by allowing for random mechanisms and monetary transfers, both of
which are generally known to be of help in fulﬁlling incentive constraints.
In fact, Allen (1992) obtains a nonempty ex ante core with randomization,
but with feasibility in expected terms, à la Prescott and Townsend (1984). The
3 Given the absence of wealth effects, no weak vs. strict core distinction arises.
4 Even for the ex ante stage there is an extensive literature that follows a different approach. For
example, Allen (1993), Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), Yannelis (1991), impose various forms of
measurability constraints on trades instead of incentive constraints. We refer the reader to Forges,
Minelli, and Vohra (2001) for a discussion.
5 Henceforth when we use the term ‘ex ante core’ without qualiﬁcation it should be taken to refer
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question then is whether this remains true with exact feasibility, as required by
mechanisms. And recent results of Forges and Minelli (1999) suggest that ran-
domization indeed does make a difference: the ex ante core is then not empty
in the example of Vohra (1999); moreover, this holds more generally, as long as
no commodity is initially owned by more than one agent, and utility functions
are additively separable across goods. So randomization cannot be neglected in
investigating the ex ante core.
It is also well known that the possibility of monetary transfers can facilitate
the satisfaction of incentive constraints. An extensive literature deals indeed
with conditions for transfer schemes to exist that achieve both incentive com-
patibility and ﬁrst-best efﬁciency; see in particular, Arrow (1979), d’Aspremont
and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982), d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1990,
1992), Crémer and McLean (1985), Green and Laffont (1979), Groves (1973),
Groves and Loeb (1975), Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990). This is the
motivation for studying the ex ante core in a quasi-linear setup.
In Section 4 we provide our main positive result, that generically (in endow-
ments) the ex ante core is nonempty. We also show how other results from the
mechanism design literature can be fruitfully applied to the present problem, and
yield generic nonemptiness of the ex ante core. In particular, several conditions
for Bayesian implementation of ﬁrst-best mechanisms (such as independent pri-
vate values) also serve to ensure nonemptiness. The argument actually proceeds
by showing that a mechanism in the ex ante core without incentive constraints can
be modiﬁed with appropriate transfers to ensure incentive compatibility, leaving
unchanged the ex ante utility levels. We have therefore, in addition to those in
Vohra (1999), Forges and Minelli (1999), and McLean and Postlewaite (2000),
several cases in which the ex ante core is nonempty.
Unfortunately, as we shall show in Section 5, extending thereby the negative
conclusion of Vohra (1999), such positive results must remain generic: we provide
a robust example of an economy with quasi-linear utilities where the ex ante core
is empty. This is so even though we permit the grand coalition to use lotteries
and free disposal of all goods including money, while the sub-coalitions use none
of those facilities.
In Section 6 we indicate why this implies a fortiori the same negative result for
standard Walrasian economies (i.e., pure exchange, with the non-negative orthant
as consumption set). Moreover, our example can be modiﬁed to show that our
main positive result does not extend to economies in which monetary transfers
are bounded.
In Section 7 an interim concept, the incentive compatible version (Vohra
(1999)) of Wilson (1978)’s coarse core, is shown to be empty too in the example.
In the Appendix we provide results on the continuity of the characteristic
function with respect to the underlying economy. Those are used in Section 5 to
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2  formulation of the problem
2 1  Private Information
Each agent’s private information is represented by his type, and an information
state refers to a proﬁle of agents’ types. The beliefs of the agents are described
by a probability distribution on the product of the sets of types. There is an alter-
native framework in which uncertainty concerns a state of the world, and private
information is described by a partition of this state space. This can be translated
into the framework with types simply by associating each element of an agent’s
information partition with a particular type. This construction may obviously gen-
erate type vectors of probability zero, but the two models are equivalent. How-
ever, types become necessary as soon as one wants to deﬁne incentive compatible
mechanisms. Indeed, a mechanism should not be deﬁned over the “true” states
of the world but over the types that are reported by the agents; there is no way to
prevent these independent reports from being ‘inconsistent,’ and yet the mecha-
nism has to be deﬁned on such reports. Of course, on type vectors that have zero
probability, a mechanism may allocate goods in a special way (e.g., conﬁscating
the agents’ endowments).
2 2  Endowments
In general, an agent’s endowments may depend on the information state. We
assume that once an agent learns his type he also knows his endowment. This is
not an ad hoc assumption; in any exchange model, agents have to be able to put
their hands on their endowment at the time of exchange. That is the relevant
time for the interim stage: when they have obtained their full private information,
including complete information about their endowment.
2 3  Preferences
The preferences of an agent may depend, in principle, on the entire proﬁle of
types; an agent’s type may indeed include information that is relevant to another
agent (common values). We assume that preferences are represented by a von-
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. At the ex ante (resp. interim) stage, one
thus measures an agent’s utility in terms of his expected utility (resp. expected
utility conditional on his type).
2 4  The Characteristic Function
The core concept rests on that of a characteristic function, and hence is appli-
cable only to games that are “well represented” by their characteristic function
(“ﬁxed threat games”, or “c-games” in Shubik’s terminology, e.g., Shubik (1982,
Chapter 6, §2, and references there)).6
6 A minimal operational meaning of ﬁxed threats in a strategic game is that the worth v  S 
(in the Harsanyi-Shapley variable threat solution) of a coalition S as a function of the vector   ofincentive compatible core 1869
And at the ex ante stage, economies with differential information are c-games,
just as in the complete information case: coalition S can even simultaneously
guarantee any point in V S and prevent CS to obtain any point outside v Cs 
(in particular, V also equals V ), just by refusing to give any goods or information
away to CS, and implementing her own mechanism: the game is “well represented
by V” in the strongest possible (much stronger than fn. 6) and most obvious
sense. Thus a full cooperative analysis for such economies can be performed by
applying any standard solution concept to their characteristic function V. The
only problem is thus to ascertain the correct characteristic function, i.e., what
utility vectors a coalition can guarantee itself, by any means.
To take into account the differential information aspects, those means have to
be construed as mechanisms: coalitions can agree, ex ante, upon any incentive
compatible mechanism—where a mechanism maps the proﬁles of players’ actions
(sending orders, giving collateral, etc.) to the set of outcomes, i.e., the feasible set.
V S describes the set of expected utility vectors that S can get for its members
by any such mechanism. Observe that this deﬁnition directly implies that V S 
is convex-valued and superadditive, hence a meaningful characteristic function.
2 5  The Class of Mechanisms
We need thus a class of mechanisms sufﬁciently wide as to capture all poten-
tially relevant (“any”) means.
A ﬁrst aspect is standard (e.g., in Myerson (1984)’s original deﬁnition): to allow
for randomizing mechanisms (thus ensuring the convexity of the set of incentive
compatible mechanisms). Not only is it part of the very deﬁnition of mechanisms,
so one should dispense with it only for models where one can prove it is imma-
terial, e.g. standard exchange economies, but it is also required for the validity of
the revelation principle itself, which we deﬁnitely do use by restricting attention
throughout to direct mechanisms.
In our context, we mentioned above an example where it made a critical dif-
ference; so certainly we cannot omit this aspect. That example was in a Walrasian
framework; without wealth effects, such phenomena are very familiar too, e.g.
from buyer-seller problems for an indivisible object (with ﬁnite type sets). For an
example falling strictly within our framework of quasi-linear exchange economies,
consider two agents, and two equally likely states, agent 1 being informed and
agent 2 not. There is a single commodity, with endowment (1 1) in each state.
Utilities in the ﬁrst state are x for agent 1 and 1 25x for agent 2, and in the other
state, x/ x+1  for 1 and 0 for 2.7
utility-weights can be obtained as maxus∈V S    uS −maxuCS∈V CS    uCS , for appropriate sets V S 
and V CS . Those should be taken as convex, since in this paradigm coalitions randomize. In partic-
ular, V is then a  -characteristic function. The criterion amounts to asking that v  S  be additively
separable as the sum of a convex function of   S and a concave function of   CS.
7 Then the endowment is the optimal deterministic incentive compatible mechanism, while (ex-
post) efﬁciency requires (0, 2), (2, 0). Replace now the allocation in the ﬁrst state by a randomization
between giving everything to 1 and giving everything to 2: expected utilities are the same, and the1870 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
A second aspect relates to free disposal, often taken as innocuous in a complete
information setup. We intend to take it seriously: the implied feasible set means
that mechanisms can throw away goods (including money). In our framework
of differential information, this might substantially facilitate the fulﬁllment of
incentive constraints. For an example, take a one commodity economy with two
agents, each one having two types; the high type has utility 2x and the low, x.
The probability of both agents being high is l/7; else their types are opposite,
both cases equally likely. A unit quantity of the commodity is available.8
The last aspect deals with variability of endowments. In that case, mechanisms
where agents would just “report their types” would face major feasibility issues
concerning the implied net trades when agents misreport. Such issues are solved
in practice in the obvious way: by the use of various forms of collateral. Thus
mechanisms ought to be able to require traders to deposit appropriate collateral
for each order, in order to ensure feasibility of any implied net trade, as, for
example, in Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1995).
This leads one to consider mechanisms in which each agent is asked to report
his type as well as his endowment. By applying the revelation principle to this
class of mechanisms, one can assume, without loss of generality, that an agent
reports just a type (recall that an agent’s endowment depends only on his type). In
particular, a report of a type is also (implicitly) a statement about the endowment.
Since endowments cannot be over-reported, types are partially veriﬁable.
3  the model
The exchange economy involves n agents, l consumption goods and money.
Agent i’s private information is represented by his type ti ∈ T i  i = 1     n   ,
where T i is a ﬁnite set. Let us deﬁne N =  1     n  and T =
n
i=1T i.L e tq be
the prior probability distribution over T; without loss of generality, we assume
that q ti >0 ∀ti ∈ T i.9 Agent i’s initial endowment ei ∈ l
+ depends only on





+× →    t  x
i m
i   → u
i t x
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expected utility for 1 of lying has decreased in the second state, and remained the same in the ﬁrst
state. One can infer from this that, at this new, equivalent mechanism, the incentive constraints
are no longer binding (cf.(14) below), so it can be perturbed a bit towards the ﬁrst best while
remaining incentive-compatible: one achieves strictly more with incentive compatible mechanisms by
randomization.
8 Consider the mechanism that gives everything to the high type when the other is of low type, which
conﬁscates everything when both claim to be high, and else splits equally. It is incentive compatible,
and yields 6/7 as expected utility to each. And any incentive compatible mechanism that does not use
free disposal yields a sum of expected utilities less than 12/7: by summing both low types’ incentive
constraints, the sum x of their consumptions, when their opponent is high, is at least 1; next, again
since free disposal is disallowed, expected total utility equals 2−
3
7x.
9 The model is fully robust to the addition of zero probability types, because, as will be clear below,
a monetary penalty can be imposed to any agent who would claim to be of such a type.incentive compatible core 1871
where ∀t ∈ T w i t    is continuous, concave and increasing. Thus, an agent’s
preferences can depend on the others’ information.
We shall associate a cooperative game, i.e., a characteristic function, with the
economy. A coalition S is a (nonempty) subset of N. The set of actions of agent










It is understood that action ai
0 of i consists of claiming to be of type ai
0 and
depositing ei ai
0  as collateral. Hence it is available to i only when of a type ti
such that ei ti ≥ei ai
0 . ts (resp. aS) denotes a typical element  ti i∈S of TS (resp.
 ai i∈S of AS). Let us deﬁne, ∀a ∈ AS,
XS a  =
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x =  x

















and let   Y  be the set of probability distributions over (the Borel sets of) Y.A
mechanism for coalition S is a pair   S   S  of maps such that
 S · a  =  S a  ∈   XS a    ∀a ∈ AS 
 S A S → 
S a →   
i





S a  ≤ 0 ∀a ∈ AS 
The mechanism  S on consumption goods consists of a type dependent lottery,
while money transfers are without loss of generality deterministic: as we shall see
below, random money transfers would generate the same characteristic function.
Feasibility requires that any allocation selected by  S be feasible, i.e., in XS · .
Some of our results will hold for deterministic mechanisms  S, in which for every
a, the lottery  S · a  is degenerate on a single allocation (i.e.,  S is just a map to
XS ·  .
Ex ante cooperative analysis means that agents contract before obtaining their
private information, and report this information after, in order to execute those
contracts. This is the relevant timing structure not only when designing institu-
tions or examining their optimality, “behind the veil of ignorance,” but e.g. also
for R&D cooperation contracts between ﬁrms, or for insurance contracts as in
Prescott and Townsend (1984, Sect. 6).
More precisely, we think of the following scenario:
• “Bargaining stage”: a coalition may “form,” in the usual sense of cooper-
ative theory.
• Nature chooses t =  t1    t n  in T according to q; each agent i is only
informed of his own type ti.
• If S has formed, every member i of S must report a type ai ∈ Ai.
• If   S   S  is the mechanism for S, every agent i ∈ S receives the bundle
xi, where  xi i∈S is selected according to the probability distribution  S · aS , and
the money transfer  i
S aS .1872 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
The mechanism   S   S  is incentive compatible if the truthful strategies (i.e.,
ai = ti for every agent i ∈ S) form a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by
the above scenario.
The expected utility of agent i ∈ S, of type ti, is, when reporting ai
U
i



























i t S\ i 
	
where t−i = tC i , and yi = ei ti −ei ai +xi. When ai = ti, we write
U
i
 S  S t
i  = U
i
 S  S t
i t
i  
  S   S  is incentive compatible iff
U
i
 S  S t
i  ≥ U
i
 S  S t
i a
i  ∀i ∈ S ∀t
i ∀a
i ∈ A
i available to t
i 
Observe that the incentive compatibility constraints that would be derived from
general random mechanisms (i.e., lotteries over consumption goods and money)
would only depend on the conditional expected money transfers. Hence we can
indeed restrict ourselves without loss of generality to deterministic money trans-
fers.
The ex ante expected utility of agent i is
U
i
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The characteristic function of the exchange economy is then:10
V




∃ an incentive compatible mechanism (2)
  S   S  for S such that v
i ≤ U
i




Transfers of ex ante utility can be carried out, e.g., through state independent
monetary transfers, without affecting incentives. Thus V ∗ can be simply described
by the TU characteristic function
v





 S  S

  S   S  incentive compatible

  (3)
According to the standard deﬁnition (see, e.g., Hildenbrand and Kirman
(1988)), the core of v∗, denoted as C v∗ , is the set of all payoff vectors v ∈ N
that are feasible for the grand coalition (i.e., such that

i∈N vi ≤v∗ N ) and that
cannot be blocked by any coalition S (i.e., such that ∀S 

i∈S vi ≥ v∗ S ). We
refer to C v∗  (or to the corresponding set of random allocations) as the ex ante
core of the economy.
10 Using, as in Holmström and Myerson (1983), “*” for incentive compatible.incentive compatible core 1873
For comparison, we also deﬁne the following characteristic functions:
v
∗
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




v S  = max





 S  S 






 S  S

  S   S  deterministic

 
These characteristic functions are related as follows:
v
∗
D S  ≤ v
∗ S  ≤ v S  = vD S   for all S  (4)
The equality between v S  and vD S  comes from the fact that random mech-
anisms cannot be useful in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints,
because the utility functions wi t ·  are concave.11 In the sequel, we shall not
refer to vD anymore, but only to v. The presence of monetary transfers makes it
possible to further simplify the characteristic function v S . It can be expressed
in terms of the maximal aggregate utility from consumption goods, i.e., without
reference to the monetary transfers, as follows:12







i t  
i
S tS  

  (5)
the maximum being over all deterministic mechanisms  S.




D N  = v N   (6)
we obviously have
C v ⊆ C v
∗  ⊆ C v
∗
D  
By the complete information results (see, e.g., Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988)),
C v  is not empty. Thus, it follows that all the ex ante cores are nonempty if (6)
holds.
11 The ﬁrst two inequalities in (4) can be strict—cf. footnote 7.
12 A similar simpliﬁcation for v∗ S  does not hold unless additional assumptions are made; see
Section 4 below.1874 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
4  generic nonemptiness
In this section, we ﬁrst state and prove our main positive result, that generically
(in endowments) the full information ﬁrst best is achievable.
We then identify speciﬁc assumptions that also guarantee the nonemptiness of
the ex ante core (generically in the beliefs in Proposition 1). For all these results,
the basic idea will be to show that, thanks to monetary transfers and suitable
assumptions, condition (6) holds. The nonemptiness of C v∗
D  and of C v∗  will
then follow by Remark 1.
Theorem 1: If each agent’s endowment is a one-to-one function of his type,
C v∗  is nonempty. More precisely v∗
D = v.
The idea is that incentive constraints are needed only to guard against claiming
to be of a less wealthy type (in the vector sense) than one is in fact: types are
partially veriﬁable.
Proof: Fix a mechanism   (i.e., without the transfers) for coalition S, that
achieves v S . Let, for t a ∈ T i, ui
ta denote i’s expected utility from   when of
type t and claiming to be of type a, i.e., ui
ta = U i
  0 t a . Consider  i ∈ T i such
that, whenever ei
t ≥ ei









t = K ·# s ∈ T i ei
s ≤ ei
t .   together with transfers  i
t to agent i claiming to be
of type t is incentive compatible.
Whenever       is incentive compatible, and, ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ TS,  i t  depends
only on ti, then
 










is such that       is incentive compatible and budget-balanced. Q.E.D.
In the previous proof, we constructed money transfers making ﬁrst best allo-
cations incentive compatible. This kind of construction is standard in the mech-
anism design literature (e.g., Arrow (1979), d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
(1979, 1982), d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1990, 1992), Crémer and
McLean (1985), Green and Laffont (1979), Groves (1973), Groves and Loeb
(1975), Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990)). In the rest of the section, we
shall use these results to establish some cases where the ex ante core is not empty.
Recall that the sum of the monetary transfers appears in the coalitions’ objec-
tive function (see (1) and (3)). Large money transfers are likely to facilitate the
fulﬁllment of the incentive compatibility constraints, but may also be costly. In
the proof above as in some particular cases below, the argument is simpliﬁed
by ﬁrst ignoring the budget balancedness condition and relying on the following
property:
automatic balance: For every incentive compatible mechanism   N   N ,
there exists a money transfer scheme  N such that   N   N  is incentiveincentive compatible core 1875





N t  = 0 ∀t ∈ T  (7)
d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982) identiﬁed assumptions (precisely
stated below) on the prior q that imply the previous property. A well-known, easy
condition is that the agents’ beliefs be independent, namely that q t =

i∈N q ti 
(see Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990)). Indeed, let   N   N  be an incentive















−i  ∀i ∈ N t∈ T
is incentive compatible. Then, as at the end of the above proof, there also exists
  such that   N   N  is incentive compatible and budget-balanced.
Under automatic balance, the deﬁnition of v∗ N  simpliﬁes to:
v

















where the maximum is over all mechanisms  N for which there exists a money
transfer scheme  N such that   N   N  is incentive compatible (the monetary
transfers have disappeared from the objective function and the feasibility require-
ment on  N can be dispensed with).13
The ﬁrst condition of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982) on the prior
q can be formulated as follows:14
Condition B: For every mapping f T→ , there exists a money transfer
scheme   T→ n such that

i∈N  i t  = f t for every t ∈ T and ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti,

















Clearly if the condition holds for f = 0, it does for every f (d’Aspremont,
Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992, 1995)). The interpretation of Condition B is
straightforward: even if the agents’ utility functions wi were identically zero (so
that only the monetary transfers would generate utility), there would exist a bal-
anced, strictly incentive compatible monetary transfer scheme. Hence, by multi-
plying these transfers by an appropriate constant, for any (typically not incentive
compatible) mechanism  N on consumption goods, there exists a money trans-
fer scheme  N satisfying (7) such that   N   N  is (strictly) incentive compatible.
13 This observation will also be useful in Section 5.
14 As in d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992), we use the “primal” form of the condi-
tions initially introduced in d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982).1876 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992) also show that Condition B is
generic provided that n ≥ 3 and no player is fully informed. Johnson, Pratt, and
Zeckhauser (1990) identify conditions on the agents’ beliefs that are easy to check
and imply Condition B. In particular, letting qi i+1  i+1mod n denote agent i’s
conditional probability distribution (induced by q) over T i+1, the following con-
dition implies Condition B:
q
i i+1 · t
i   = q
i i+1 · s




i  = s
i 
Proposition 1: Under Condition B, C v∗  is nonempty. More precisely, (6)
holds.
Proof: If Condition B holds, any deterministic mechanism  N that achieves
v N  (see (5)) can be made incentive compatible thanks to a money transfer
scheme  N satisfying (7). Hence, v∗
D N , given by (8), equals v N . Q.E.D.
Remark 2: In fact, it sufﬁces to assume that Condition B holds just for those
ai such that ei ai  = ei ti . Indeed, one can then ﬁrst add to the mechanism
 N a sufﬁciently high multiple of the money transfer scheme   of Condition B
(with f = 0) to make sure that no deviations are proﬁtable to another type with
the same endowment. Add then to the mechanism a further transfer scheme,
constructed as in Theorem 1, to ensure that also deviations to a type with smaller
endowment are not proﬁtable.
Condition B is stronger than the next condition, obtained by weakening the
inequalities:
Condition C: For every mapping f  T → , there exists a money transfer
scheme    T → n such that





















The latter condition implies automatic balance (see Johnson, Pratt, and Zeck-
hauser (1990)). Unlike in Condition B, one cannot focus on f = 0 here. Indeed,
C would then hold for any beliefs (by taking   = 0), which is not true (see
d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992, 1995)).
As observed in d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992, 1995), Condi-
tion C is much weaker than B. For example, independent beliefs cannot satisfy
the latter (easy) but do satisfy the former (cf. d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
(1979, 1982)). In fact, d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992, 1995) show
that Condition B is equivalent to C and the following condition of correlation
between the agents’ beliefs:
q · t
i   = q · s




i  = s
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This property is called “belief announcement” in Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser
(1990). The linear independence of agent i’s beliefs q · ti , ti ∈T i, which is much
stronger than “belief announcement,” is often considered in the literature (see,
e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 7.6)). As pointed out above, John-
son, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990) consider another strengthening of “beliefs
announcement,” by requiring the previous condition of correlation on the beliefs
of every agent i over agent i+1  mod n .
In the next two propositions, we assume values are private, i.e.
w
i t x
i  = w
i t
i x




Proposition 2: Under Condition C (in particular, if beliefs are independent),
if values are private, then C v∗  is nonempty. More precisely, (6) holds.
Proof: As in the previous proof, take a mechanism  N that achieves v N    N
is ex ante efﬁcient. Make it ex post efﬁcient by specifying








if q t = 0 
By Groves (1973) (see also Green and Laffont (1979) and Groves and Loeb
(1975)), there exists a money transfer scheme  N (not necessarily balanced)
such that   N   N  is incentive compatible. By Condition C,  N can then be fur-
ther made to satisfy automatic balance (argument stemming from d’Aspremont,
Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992)). Q.E.D.
In the same vein, we deduce the following from d’Aspremont, Crémer, and
Gérard-Varet (1990):
Proposition 3: If #T i ≤ 2 for every i ∈ N and values are private, then C v∗ 
is nonempty. More precisely, v∗
D = v.
Proof: d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1990) show that S has then
an ex post efﬁcient, incentive compatible mechanism   S   S  satisfying (7). So,
v∗
D = v. Q.E.D.
The assumption #T i ≤ 2 is very strong, but does not involve the beliefs q.I t
is not related with Condition C; for instance, if n = 2, Condition C is equivalent
to independent beliefs (see d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1992)).
Remark 3: d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet (1990, 1992) point out
that the mechanisms used in the proof of Proposition 3 are incentive compat-
ible in dominant strategies but are not Groves mechanisms. For an analysis of
conditions under which Bayesian and dominant strategy incentive compatibility
are equivalent, and the connection to Groves mechanisms, see Williams (1999).
These conditions involve independent private values. Even in this particular case,1878 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
the equivalence result in Williams (1999) does not apply to our model, since the
set of types is ﬁnite.
Remark 4: The positive results of this section typically rely on unlimited
monetary transfers, and may not apply in the context of Walrasian economies in
which the aggregate endowment of the transferable good is bounded. Indeed, we
will show in Section 6.2 that Theorem 1 does not extend to Walrasian economies.
5  an example in which the ex ante core is empty
In this section we show that with type-independent endowments, even in the
quasi-linear setting, and even allowing for random mechanisms, nonemptiness of
the ex ante core is not guaranteed. There are limits to how far the positive results
can be pushed. We shall provide an example of an economy with quasi-linear
utilities in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is empty. This will imply,
in particular, that the assumption of endowments being a one-to-one function
of types cannot be dropped from Theorem 1, the assumption of private values
cannot be dropped from Proposition 2, and the assumption of separability cannot
be dropped from the positive result in Forges and Minelli (1999). It will also
show that the negative conclusion of Vohra (1999) is in fact completely robust
as to the class of mechanisms considered as well as to additional desiderata for
a “well behaved” economy. Interestingly, not only is our negative result stronger
than that in Vohra (1999), the computations are also simpler: by the transferable
utility setting, it sufﬁces to show that the game is not balanced.
In the economy described below, n=l =3; agent 1 has two equiprobable types
s and t, while agents 2 and 3 have no private information  T 1 =  s t  q s  =
q t =
1
2 T2 and T 3 are singletons).
Let the (state independent) endowments be
e
1 =  1 0 0   e
2 =  0 2 0   e
3 =  0 0 2  
and the utility functions, with x =  x1 x 2 x 3  as consumption bundle:
w
1 s x  = 2x1+f x 2+x3  
w
2 s x  = w
3 s x  = 3x1+g x2+x3  
w
1 t x  = x1+h x2 +h x3  
w
2 t x  = w
3 t x  = x2+x3 
where:
• f + → + x → min x 2 ;
• g  2
+ → +   x  y   → 2min x y ;
• h  + → + is concave, with h 0  = 0 h x ≤ x, and h ≤ 1.
For C v∗  to be empty, the positive result in Forges and Minelli (1999,
Theorem 1, and Proposition 2 (or 3)) imply that the following three features areincentive compatible core 1879
indispensable: (i) nonseparability of the utility functions, given the structure of
endowments, so of g, or nonlinearity of f; (ii) the independence of endowments
with respect to the state; (iii) the dependence of the utility functions of agents 2
and 3 on agent 1’s type (nonprivate values).
Since s and t have probability
1
2, we consider henceforth the sum of the utilities
associated with each type, instead of the corresponding expected utility.
In order to show that C v∗  is empty, we follow the following steps:
Step 1: We compute v, and show that v is exactly balanced, i.e.
v N  =
1
2
 v  1 2  +v  1 3  +v  2 3     (9)
Step 2: In subcoalitions, incentives entail no efﬁciency-loss:
v
∗
D S  = v S  for every S   S =2 
Hence, by (4),
v
∗ S  = v S  for every S   S =2  (10)
Step 3: For C v∗  to be nonempty, v∗ must be balanced (Bondareva-Shapley),
i.e., by (9) and (10), v∗ N  = v N . We will show that v∗ N  < v N  (assuming
h 1 >0 5).
Before proceeding to the proofs of these three steps it will be useful to simplify
the incentive constraints in this example.
Let S be a coalition containing agent 1. The beliefs of its members being
trivially independent, v∗ S  takes a simple form, as v∗ N  in (8):
v






















where the maximum is over all mechanisms  S that can be made incentive com-
patible for agent 1 by appropriate monetary transfers, i.e., for which there exist
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1 s  
So, as expected, monetary transfers play a double role here: they lead to a TU
cooperative game, as under complete information, but they also facilitate the
fulﬁllment of the incentive constraints.
15 Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows this in general.1880 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
5 1 
Step 1: Without incentive constraints, efﬁciency of a deterministic mecha-
nism, x, in the grand coalition requires, in state s, x1
1 = 0, x1
2 +x1
3 ≤ 2, xi
2 = xi
3 ∀i,
leading to a total utility of 7, and no trade with 1 in state t, hence total utility 5.
So,
v N  = 12 
Efﬁciency in coalition  1 2  (or  1 3 ) similarly requires in state s that both
traders swap their endowments, leading to utility 5, and no trade in state t, hence
utility 3. Thus:
v  1 2   = v  1 3   = 8 
And clearly, by trading to  0 1 1   0 1 1 ,
v  2 3   = 8 also 
Thus the exact balancedness condition (9) holds.
5 2 
Step 2: Coalition  2 3  does not face any incentive compatibility constraint,
so v∗  2 3   = v  2 3  .
Let us check that the ﬁrst best allocation of coalition  1 2  satisﬁes the incen-
tive compatibility condition (14), namely that
w
1 s  0 2 0  w
1 t  1 0 0   ≥ w
1 s  1 0 0  +w
1 t  0 2 0  
i.e., 2+1 ≥ 2+h 2 : obvious. We have thus established (10).
5 3 
Step 3: We want to prove that v∗ N  < v N . Suppose not. Then there is
a ﬁrst-best incentive compatible mechanism, i.e., satisfying (14) and carried by
Eff s ×Eff t, where Eff s and Eff t denote the set of optimal allocations in states
s and t respectively. But (14), when bringing all terms to one side, means there
exists a probability distribution on Eff s ×Eff t such that the expectation of some
function is nonnegative: i.e., this function is nonnegative at some point. Thus, (14)
is satisﬁed at some point in Eff s ×Eff t. Since further only player 1’s coordinates




t the projections of Eff s and Eff t on player
1’s coordinates, i.e. the set of commodity bundles to player 1 that are compatible
in the corresponding state with a ﬁrst best allocation.




t. Since, by Step
1, Eff
1
s =   0 x x   0 ≤ x ≤ 1  and Eff
1
t =   1 0 0  , we get, using us ·  for theincentive compatible core 1881
utility of player 1 of type s as a function of his announcement “·”, and similarly
for ut:
us s  = 2x  us t  = 2 u t s  = 2h x   ut t  = 1 
The incentive constraints (14) become then
1+2x ≥ 2+2h x  
which cannot be, since 2+2h x − 1+2x  is concave, and positive both at 0 and
1 (assuming h 1 >0 5 .
5 4  Robustness of the Example
Let preferences, endowments, and the probability over states of nature vary in
the above framework (while keeping the basic structure: n = l = 3; agent 1 has
two types s and t, agents 2 and 3 have no private information). Let us show that
the ex ante core is empty in a neighborhood of the example: else, by Proposition
4 in the Appendix, there would be a sequence of economies with nonempty ex
ante core converging to the example. Fix a mechanism in each of those cores.
By Proposition 5 (see Appendix), one can extract a subsequence such that those
mechanisms converge, and the limit is then an incentive compatible mechanism
for our example, with expected utilities going to the limit. So some subcoalition
can get more with an incentive compatible mechanism of its own, else any Pareto-
efﬁcient point in V ∗ N  that Pareto dominates this expected utility vector would
belong to the core. So that subcoalition can get more with incentive compatible
mechanisms in the limit than along the sequence. So it must be coalition  1 2 
(or  1 3 ), since those are the only ones where incentive constraints matter. But
Step 2 showed that the incentive constraint for the ﬁrst best mechanism of  1 2 
was satisﬁed strictly (assuming h 2 <1); hence it must still be satisﬁed in the
neighborhood: contradiction.
In other words, for our example, there exists  >0 and a ﬁnite set of consump-
tion bundles x  such that, whenever the probability on states, the endowments,
and the utilities of each x  are  -close to those in the example, the ex ante core
is still empty. So the example is completely robust as to additional requirements
for a well-behaved economy (strictly positive endowments, utilities that are, in a
neighborhood of the positive orthant, bounded and smooth with negative deﬁnite
Hessian, etc.).
6  walrasian economies
6 1  Robustness in a Stronger Sense
The characteristic function v∗ deﬁned in Section 3 by (3) is appropriate if
the agents are allowed to make unlimited money transfers. We show now that
the previous example can be used to construct a standard NTU economy, in
which the agents’ holdings of money must remain nonnegative, and whose ex ante
incentive compatible core is empty. We also show that robustness holds in an
even stronger sense in this context.1882 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
For each subcoalition S, and every member of it, ﬁx an efﬁcient incentive com-
patible mechanism of S giving this member the whole surplus above the individ-
ually rational levels. Each of those ﬁnitely many mechanisms involves, T being
ﬁnite, a ﬁnite number of possible money transfers away from each individual.
Take the largest such amount (over all the above mechanisms, all individuals, and
all t ∈ T), and give this to each trader as his initial endowment of money. This
does not change anything. It just amounts to a translation of each player’s utility
scale. Now we can restrict money holdings to remain nonnegative: the character-
istic function V ∗ (cf. (2)) can only decrease by this additional restriction; before
the restriction it gave each coalition S exactly the set of all utility vectors (to
S) with sum not higher than v∗ S ; after the restriction, our speciﬁcation of the
initial endowments of money ensures that the extreme points of the individually
rational part of the former V ∗ S  still belong to the new V ∗ S : since this is con-
vex, it follows that the individually rational part of V ∗ did not change. Since the
core depends only on this individually rational part, the core is unchanged too.
Recall that in Section 5.4 we showed robustness with respect to the parameters
of the economy, keeping ﬁxed the set of states  s t . In the NTU case we will
show that robustness holds in a stronger sense: one can allow for an arbitrary
(ﬁnite) set of states, and information partitions, as long as the limit probability
distribution is carried by two states that player 1 distinguishes and the others not.
Indeed, in the proof in Section 5.4, upper semi-continuity in the TU case
required eliminating transfers from the system in order to get a compact valued
correspondence. In the NTU case, we get compactness for free since all mecha-
nisms are carried by a ﬁxed cube delimited by some upper bound on the aggre-
gate endowments. So the correspondence to incentive compatible mechanisms is
upper semi-continuous, since the incentive inequalities are weak.
We observed above that “the incentive constraint for the ﬁrst best mechanism
of coalition  1 2  is satisﬁed strictly.” This is the single TU incentive constraint,
after eliminating transfers. But this implies that the set of transfers that solve
the system of two incentive constraints is open. Thus some ﬁrst best mechanism
(including transfers) satisﬁes both incentive constraints strictly.
The rest of the proof is the same as in the TU case.
6 2  Type Dependent Endowments
The positive results of Section 4 relied on the availability of unlimited mone-
tary transfers. In particular, the proof of Theorem 1 relied on a transfer mecha-
nism giving bonuses to the wealthy types, and conversely for the less wealthy. In
a Walrasian economy, such schemes may become infeasible, the possible trans-
fers being bounded. And indeed, the core is empty in the following variation on
our previous example:
Re-interpret it as Walrasian, i.e., without money, and where now:
(i) agent 1 has a higher endowment in state t, e1 t  =  1+  0 0 , thereby
satisfying the main hypothesis of Theorem 1;
(ii) the function h has the form h x  =  5min x 1 .incentive compatible core 1883
For a pay-off vector   v = v1 v2 v3 , let u=v1−  v =v2+v3. Call   v unblocked
if no proper subcoalition blocks it (with strict improvement for each coalition
member, i.e., as in the weak core), and feasible if it is the expected utility vector
of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Step 1: For   v unblocked, v ≥ 8.
Proof: If v2 < 2o rv3 < 2, agent 2 or 3 blocks on his own. Else coalition
 2 3  blocks by trading independently of the state to  0 x x   0 2−x 2−x 
for appropriate x ∈  0 2 —e.g., x = 1+  v2−v3 /8 . Q.E.D.
Step 2: For   v unblocked, 3u+v ≥ 19.
Proof: If u ≥ 4, this follows from Step 1. If u<3, agent 1 blocks on his
own. And for 3 ≤ u<4, let agents 1 and 2 together use the incentive compatible
mechanism that yields no-trade in state t, and in state s the allocation  x 2   1−
x 0  for x =
1
2 u−3+   ≤
1
2: they get v1 = u+ +   2v2 = 19−3u−3 ,s oo n e
must have 3u+2v2 ≥ 19, and similarly 3u+2v3 ≥ 19; hence the result. Q.E.D.
Step 3: For   v feasible, 5u+3v ≤ 42.
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The second integrand is ≤ 6+2 , since x1
1 ≤ 1+  

xi
2 ≤ 2 

xi
3 ≤ 2. There
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3  ≤ 2−max x1
2 x1
3 . Thus, since also
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xi
1 ≤ 1, the ﬁrst









3 − 5min x
1
2 1 − 5min x
1
3 1  
This increases when decreasing the larger of x1
2 and x1
3. So it is, for y =
min x1
2 x1
3 , majorised by 21+5min 2y 2 −6y−min y 1  ≤ 24. Q.E.D.
Step 4: The weak core is empty.
Proof: 3 times the inequality of Step 3 minus 5 times that of Step 2 yields
4v ≤ 31, contradicting Step 1.
7  the interim stage
It is natural to ask whether our results extend to a similar notion of core for
the case where decisions are made at the interim stage.
Wilson (1978) provided a seminal analysis of the core at the interim stage
(without imposing incentive constraints). An important concept developed in Wil-
son (1978) was that of the coarse core, in which coalitions coordinate on mecha-
nisms at the interim stage and rely on a common knowledge informational event
to evaluate their interim utilities. Wilson proved that the coarse core is nonempty
under standard conditions.16 However, Vohra (1999) showed that Wilson’s posi-
tive result does not extend to the case in which incentive constraints are imposed,
i.e., the incentive compatible coarse core may be empty.
Is it possible to obtain nonemptiness of the incentive compatible coarse core
by permitting monetary transfers? Unfortunately, the approach of Section 4,
which was so fruitful in the ex ante case, does not immediately extend to the
interim case. While monetary transfers allow us to transfer ex ante utility across
consumers without affecting incentive constraints, the same need not be true in
terms of transfers of interim utility (across types). Indeed, one ingredient of the
approach in Section 4 was to construct, corresponding to an efﬁcient outcome,
a transfer scheme satisfying incentive compatibility. And an appropriate transfer
scheme will typically affect interim utilities. Indeed, restrictions on interim utility
(such as interim individual rationality) may be too demanding if one insists on
ﬁrst-best efﬁciency. It is possible, even in an economy with independent, private
values that there exists no incentive compatible mechanism that is both interim
individually rational and ﬁrst best efﬁcient; see, for example, Table 5.2 in Milgrom
and Roberts (1992).17 Thus the kind of argument used in Section 4 to obtain
positive results cannot be extended to the incentive compatible coarse core.
16 The notion of the ﬁne core in Wilson (1978) is not relevant for our purposes since, as shown in
Wilson (1978), it can be empty even without the imposition of incentive constraints.
17 The only reason we cannot directly apply the impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) here is that they require a continuum of types.incentive compatible core 1885
Recall that our approach in Section 4 relied on showing that, under suit-
able assumptions, incentive constraints did not preclude ﬁrst-best efﬁciency.
Nonemptiness then followed easily from Remark 1. While that approach may
no longer be fruitful, the possibility remains open that the incentive compatible
coarse core is nonempty if conditions such as B or C hold.18 In particular, it is not
known to us whether the incentive compatible coarse core is generally nonempty
in the case of independent private values or the case in which the endowment of
each agent is a one-to-one function of his type. These are important questions
that still remain open.
However, we can show that the incentive compatible coarse core is empty in
the example of Section 5, thereby strengthening the conclusion in Vohra (1999);
quasi-linearity and randomness are not enough to guarantee the nonemptiness
of the incentive compatible coarse core:
In our example, the incentive compatible coarse core19 differs from the ex ante
incentive compatible core for precisely the following reasons. A coarse objection
for a coalition containing agent 1 and some uninformed consumer(s) requires
increasing the ex ante utility of each uninformed consumer and increasing the
utility of consumer 1 in both states. Coalition  1  has a coarse objection if con-
sumer 1 can obtain a higher utility in either state with his own endowments. (A
coarse objection by a coalition that does not contain agent 1 is exactly the same
as an ex ante objection).
To reﬁne our earlier conclusion that v∗ N  < 12, we ﬁrst show that
v
∗ N  ≤ 13−2h 1  







1     dx
1 s −  dx
1 t  ≥ 0
and then our objective function (of) should satisfy










i  ≤ 13−2h 1  
Consider ﬁrst the allocation to agents 2 and 3 who don’t appear in ic.B y
concavity of w2 s x2 +w3 s x3  and w2 t x2 +w3 t x3 , it is better to replace
 x2 x3  by its conditional expectation given x1. Assume, by monotonicity, that
they share everything agent 1 does not get (i.e., no free disposal); and, since w2 =
18 An example such as that of Milgrom and Roberts (1992) we mentioned above cannot be invoked
to settle this issue negatively. That result concerns ﬁrst-best efﬁciency; allocations in the incentive
compatible coarse core are only required to be incentive efﬁcient. Indeed, in a two-agent economy
(such as the one considered in Milgrom and Roberts (1992) or Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)),
the incentive compatible coarse core corresponds to the set of interim incentive efﬁcient and interim
individually rational mechanisms, and is, therefore, nonempty under standard assumptions.
19 See Vohra (1999) for a general deﬁnition.1886 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
w3, that they share it equally: hence, x2 = x3 =
1
2  1 2 2 −x1 , and we can now
view   s    t  as probability distributions over Y =  x ∈ 3
+   x1 ≤ 1 x 2 x 3 ≤ 2 .
By additive separability and linearity of x1 in all utility functions, this coordi-
nate can be replaced in the mechanism by its expectation, without affecting either
ic or of. Thus we get xs x t ∈ 0 1 , and   s    t  are distributions on  0 2 2.T o




 f y+z −h y −h z     dy dz s −  dy dz t  ≥ xt −xs
















 h y +h z −y−z   dy dz t +4 ≤ 13−2h 1  
So, eliminating xt −xs, it sufﬁces to prove that



















 h y +h z −y−z   dy dz t ≤ 6−2h 1  
It sufﬁces therefore to prove that, on  0 2 2:









−h y −h z  ≤ 6−2h 1  
from   t   2h y −y+2h z −z−f y+z  ≤ 0 
For the second inequality, best is to equalize y and z,a ty +z constant, by
concavity of h. So, replacing f, it amounts to 2h x −x−min x 1  ≤ 0, which
follows from h x  ≤ min x 1 .
Replacing now f and g in the ﬁrst, there remains to prove
2min y+z 2 −2max y z −h y −h z  ≤ 2−2h 1  
To increase the left-hand member, one should clearly decrease y and z if y +
z>2. Thus y+z ≤ 2, and hence the objective equals 2min y z −h y −h z :
one should decrease the maximum of y and z. We get then y = z ≤ 1, where
the objective 2y−2h y  is increasing: the maximum is at y = z = 1, and yields
equality. This completes the proof that v∗ N  ≤ 13−2h 1 .
Now assume that h 1 >  75, so that v∗ N  < 11 5. Suppose there exists a
mechanism,      , which belongs to the incentive compatible coarse core. Cor-
responding to this mechanism, let ui    refer to the utility of consumer i in state
  and U i the sum of utilities of consumer i in the two states. Let the sum of
utilities of the three consumers in both states be denoted U = u1 s +u1 t +
U 2+U 3.incentive compatible core 1887
We know that if U 2 +U 3 < 8, then coalition  2 3  has an ex-ante incentive
compatible objection. Since this is a coalition of uninformed agents, this is also
a coarse objection, which contradicts the hypothesis that this mechanism is in
the incentive compatible coarse core. Thus we may henceforth assume that U 2+
U 3 ≥ 8.
Interim individual rationality implies that u1 s  ≥ 2 and u1 t  ≥ 1. This along
with the condition U 2 +U 3 ≥ 8 implies that there exist   s    t , and  , all
nonnegative, such that
u
1 s  = 2+  s   u
1 t  = 1+  t  
U
2+U
3 = 8+     s +  t + <0 5 
Without loss of generality, U 2 ≤4+0 5 . Consider coalition  1 2  and the incen-
tive compatible mechanism in which they swap their goods in state s and there
is no trade in state t. This yields utilities,
w
1 s  = 2 w
1 t  = 1 w
2 s  = 3 w
2 t  = 2 
Suppose consumer 2 transfers to consumers 1, in each state (thereby retaining
incentive compatibility) the amount m =    s +  t  /2+1/4. Since   s  < 0 5
and   t  < 0 5, m>max   s    t  . This means that consumer 1 is better-off in
both states. Consumer 2 is also better off, receiving the sum of utilities
5−   s +  t +1/2 >5− 1−   ≥ 4+0 5  
Thus  1 2  has an incentive compatible coarse objection; contradiction.
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APPENDIX: Continuity of the Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
as a Function of the Economy
Lemma 1: Let C be a ﬁnite-dimensional compact convex set, and, with A a directed set and   ∈ A,
let f f   be concave on C, and f real-valued and continuous. If f  is uniformly bounded below and
limsupf  ≤ f, then ∀ >0 ∃ 0 ∈ A  f  ≤ f + ∀  ≥  0.
Proof: Since f is, by Dini’s theorem (and the separation theorem), the uniform limit of the
minima of ﬁnitely many afﬁne functions   that lie everywhere strictly above it, it sufﬁces to show that
for any such   there exists  0 such that, for   ≥  0 f   ≤  . Subtracting then   from all functions,
we have reduced the problem to the case where f =−  . Assume without loss of generality that
f  ≥− 1 ∀ , and that C is full-dimensional.1888 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
Let r denote the radius of the largest ball contained in C.F o rx ∈ C, denote by fx the smallest
concave function on C that is ≥−1 everywhere and ≥0a tx. Note that  y ∈ C   fx y  > − /2 
contains an open ball (centered at some point of C) of radius r /2. Let then F be a ﬁnite subset
of C that intersects every such ball (i.e., such that any point of C is at distance less than r /2 from
some point in F  e.g., the centers of a ﬁnite open covering by such balls). Choose then  0 such that,
∀  ≥  0 f   x  <  /2 ∀x ∈ F. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: Let C be a ﬁnite-dimensional compact convex polyhedron. If a net of concave functions
on C converges pointwise to a real-valued continuous function on C, it does so uniformly.
Proof: f is concave as a limit of concave functions. Given a barycentric subdivision s of the
polyhedron, denote by fs the piecewise linear function (on s) that coincides with f at all vertices of
s  f ≥fs, and, by the uniform continuity of f, one can choose s sufﬁciently ﬁne that fs >f− . Choose
then  0 such that, ∀  ≥  0 f   >f−  at every vertex of s—so, by concavity, f  >f s − >f−2 
everywhere. The previous lemma gives now the other half of the conclusion. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4: Let U be the space of all concave continuous functions on l
+ that are bounded
below. Fix a probability   on + with ﬁnite ﬁrst order moment and unbounded support, and, for u v∈U,
let d u v =
  
0 sup x ≤r  u x −v x    dr . Then  U d  is a complete, separable metric space, and its
topology, the pointwise topology.
Proof: Observe ﬁrst that any u ∈ U is monotone: u y  < u x  for y ≥ x would by concavity
imply that limt→  u  1−t x+ty  =−   . Next, consider a pointwise convergent net u    → u in
U: by the previous lemma, u    → u uniformly on compact sets (each of them being contained
in a compact, convex polyhedron in l
+). So, for   ≥  0, sup x ≤1  u  x −u x  ≤1 (using for  · 
the  1-norm). Let M = 1+sup x ≤1  u x    then, for   ≥  0 u   x  ≥− M ∀x by monotonicity,
and u  x  ≤− M +2M x  for  x ≥1 by concavity, so  u  x  ≤M +2M x ∀ x. This implies
ﬁrst that d u 0 < ,s od u v  <  ∀ u v ∈ U  d is a distance. Further, the same bound yields,
by the previous lemma and the dominated convergence theorem (which applies here to nets, since
f  r  = sup ≥  sup x ≤r  u  x −u x   decreases to 0 uniformly on compact sets), that d u  u → 0 
the d-topology is weaker than the point-wise topology—and the converse is obvious. Given this,
the minima of ﬁnitely many afﬁne functions with rational coefﬁcients are clearly dense:  U d  is
separable; and the completeness is clear. Q.E.D.
Remark 5: As x∧n → x shows, supr 1∧r−1 sup x ≤r  u x −v x   would not be an appropriate
distance.
The next lemma is for the sake of completeness: Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990) do this
even without independence (cf. also Crémer and McLean (1985)).
Lemma 3: The projection on   XN T of the set of incentive compatible mechanisms for an economy
with independent types is the set of solutions of the system: ∀i ∈ N ∀n>1 ∀ ti











k+1   ≥ 0 (15)
where, for s t ∈ T i g i s t  =

t−i q t−i 

l
+ wi s t−i xi   dxi t t−i .
Proof: Assume for notational simplicity that ∀i ∀t wi t 0  = 0. It sufﬁces to express the system
of incentive constraints with one transfer for each type of each agent (so:

i∈N #T i independent real
variables), since one can then always afterwards balance the transfers as at the end of the proof of
Theorem 1. Eliminating by Farkas’ Lemma the transfers from this system yields

s t
As t gi t t −gi t s   ≥ 0
where A is a nonnegative T i ×T i-matrix with ∀t0 ∈ T i 

t At t0 =

t At0 t, (and At0 t0 = 0). The
extreme points of this set are clearly the cycles, i.e. those matrices A where the As t as well asincentive compatible core 1889
the row and column sums belong to  0 1 . Think indeed of As t as representing a ﬂow from s to t:
the conditions express that inﬂow equals outﬂow at each point. It is then clear how to decompose
such a ﬂow as a sum of cycles. Q.E.D.
Remark 6: Henceforth it is this projection that we will call the set of incentive compatible mech-
anisms.
Proposition 5: Topologize the space of economies with the usual topology on   T  and on the
endowments, and the pointwise topology on each ui
t. With the weak topology on   XN T, the correspon-
dence from economies with independent types to incentive compatible mechanisms is compact, convex
valued, and upper semi-continuous.
Proof: The convexity is clear from the linearity of inequalities (15). For the rest, we take a con-
vergent sequence (by Proposition 4) of such economies, together with an incentive compatible mech-
anism for each, and show that we can extract a subsequence along which the mechanisms converge
too, and that then the limiting mechanism is an incentive compatible mechanism for the limiting
economy. Since endowments converge, the set of all feasible allocations, for all those economies, is
contained in some ﬁxed big cube. Hence our sequence of mechanisms, as a sequence of probabilities
on this cube, contains a weak∗-convergent subsequence. Assume thus it is itself convergent. Continu-
ity of the endowments ensures that the limiting distribution is feasible, a mechanism. And the fact
that the integrals of a uniformly convergent sequence of continuous function with respect to a weakly
convergent sequence of probabilities go to the limit ensures that the (weak) inequalities (15), hence
the incentive compatibility, remain true in the limit. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: v∗ is upper semi-continuous on the space of economies with independent types.
Proof. Since each coalition S is such an economy on its own, this follows from Proposition 5, the
sum of expected utilities (cf. (8)) being a continuous function on the graph of that correspondence, by
continuity of the integrals of a uniformly convergent sequence of continuous functions with respect
to a weakly convergent sequence of probabilities. Q.E.D.
Remark 7: While the nature of the arguments up to here is needed even if one were just inter-
ested in proving the example robust (as seen in Section 5.4), this is no longer true for those that
follow, which are there just as a ﬁrst attempt to elucidate the robustness in our framework of the
concepts of characteristic function and of incentive compatibility.
In the sequel, we basically show that a variation on the argument used above and in Section 5.4
works in general; i.e., if incentive constraints are not satisﬁed strictly, the mechanism can be slightly
perturbed so as to satisfy them strictly.
Lemma 4: The incentive compatible mechanisms of an economy with independent types are the
solutions of system (15), where further, for k l ∈ n k = l ⇒ ti
k  ∼ ti
l, deﬁning, for s t ∈ T i s∼ t ⇐⇒
∀t−i ∈

j =i T j ∀x ∈ l
+  x≤

j∈N ej ⇒ wi s t−i x −wi s t−i 0  = wi t t−i x −wi t t−i 0 .
Its interior is nonempty in the weak∗ space of all mechanisms, and all those inequalities are strict there.
Proof. Assume for notational simplicity that ∀i ∀t wi t 0  = 0. For the ﬁrst part, take a cycle,
as obtained from Lemma 3, where, for some k  = l tk ∼ tl. Numbering can start at one of them, so
1 ≤ l<n , and tl ∼ t0. Then the sum corresponding to this cycle, numbered from 1 to n, decomposes
into the two sums from 1 to l and from l+1t on, by the equalities g tn t 1 =g tl t 1  and g tl t l+1 =
g tn t l+1  , which follow directly from tl ∼ tn. Thus the ﬁrst part, a cycle of length 1 is an identity.
As to the second part, note ﬁrst that, given a ﬁnite system of continuous linear weak inequalities
on a compact, convex set in a locally convex space, either all of them are satisﬁed strictly at some
point, so the solution set has nonempty interior, or some convex combination of them is never so,
i.e., the corresponding equality holds. Indeed, just map everything to Euclidean space, using the1890 f.forges, j. -f.mertens, and r.vohra
given linear functionals: if the (compact, convex) image is disjoint from the interior of the positive
orthant, they can be weakly separated by a nonzero linear functional; this must be nonnegative, and
normalizing it to 1 yields then a convex combination of the original functionals.
We apply this to our incentive constraints: assuming that there exists no mechanism where all







s t gi t t −gi t s   ≤ 0
for any mechanism  , where Ai is a positive linear combination of cycle matrices as used in the ﬁrst
part.
Then, since any   can be modiﬁed such as to distribute 0 to all i  = i0, the sum over i can as well
be limited to i = i0; i.e., we can assume Ai
s t = 0 for i  = i0. So, each individual summand in the sum
over i ∈ I must be ≤0, and for at least one of them the matrix Ai contains a nontrivial cycle in the
sense of the ﬁrst part. There is then no loss of generality to assume this i to be 1, and Ai = 0 for
i  =1. Further, since only the coordinate x1 of the allocation selected by   appears in the system now,




Now, similarly, we can set to zero all coordinates of the allocation corresponding to t−1  = t−1
0 , for
any ﬁxed t−1
0 , so the inequality has to hold not only for the g1, but for each g−1
t  t−1 ∈

j =1 T j, with
q t−1 >0), deﬁned by g−1
t  s t  =

l





t  t t −g
−1












−1 x t −w
1 t t
−1 x s   ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Y
T1
 ∀t
−1  q  t
−1 >0 
Since x varies in a product Y T1, and the sum decomposes into terms depending each only on a
single coordinate of x, and vanishing with it, it must be that each partial sum over terms implying










−1 x  




0 , where T
j
0 =  t ∈ T j   q t  > 0 , and, ∀t ∈ T 1 v t T −1 ×Y →    t −1 x  →
w1 t t−1 x . Then, ic conditions being needed only on T 1
0 , so cycles are carried by T 1
0 (hence As t =0
outside T 1
0 ×T 1









I.e., let ∀t ∈ T 1












At svs where  t =

s∈T 
At s > 0 
Let  t t−1 x ≥ 0 be the corresponding slack: by summing over t ∈ T   

t  tvt +

t  t =

s t At svs = 






At svs ∀t ∈ T
  
A being a sum of nontrivial cycles means t  ∼s if At s >0, i.e., vt  =vs: each vt for t ∈T   is a convex
combination of the others: contradiction, for vt extreme in the convex hull of  vs   s ∈ T   . Q.E.D.incentive compatible core 1891
Proposition 6: The correspondence of Proposition 5 is continuous on the open, dense set of
economies where any two different types of any agent have, for at least some vector of types of the others,
different preferences over the feasible set (“preference announcement”).
Proof: Openness and density are clear. Upper semi-continuity was obtained in Proposition 5.
For the lower semi-continuity, the ∼ equivalence classes being singletons at those economies, any
incentive constraint that occurs in the neighborhood is, by Lemma 4, satisﬁed strictly at an interior
point, which is thus still interior in the neighborhood. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2: v∗ N  is continuous on the above open set.
Remark 8: “Preference announcement” over the feasible set of the grand coalition does not
imply that the same property holds over the (more restricted) feasible set of a smaller coalition. The
continuity of v∗ S , for S  = N, therefore, does not follow from Proposition 6.
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